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Mater et Magistra

The recent encyclical of John XXIII,
Mater et Magistra, is a lengthy 25,000
word document which is perhaps the most
significant writing to have come from the
pen of John XXIII in the three years of
his reign. As a definitive statement of
Catholic social teaching it restates and applies to the world of the 1960's, the social
principles set forth in the Rerum Novarum
of Leo XIII and the Quadragesimo Anno
of Pius XI. It is an encyclical which all
lawyers, particularly Catholic lawyers,
should read since it relates directly to the
activities in which they are primarily
involved.
The current issue of Catholic Mind publishes Mater et Magistra in its entirety. In
addition, it features an excellent article
which should prove of great assistance to
those who seek an understanding and analysis of this latest encyclical. Entitled "Pope
John's Gift to Mankind," it is written by
Father John Cronin, S.S., Assistant Director of the Social Action Department of
the National Catholic Welfare Conference.
According to Father Cronin it is difficult
to appraise the new encyclical in a brief
article. The difficulty arises from the richness of its contents and the complexity of
its treatment of grave social problems
troubling the world today. Obviously, the
Pope has taken a keen and penetrating

look at the swift social changes of the past
thirty years.
In discussing some of the highlights of
the encyclical Father Cronin observes that
one major conclusion stands out when this
momentous document is studied carefully.
In the classic struggle between the liberal
and the conservative viewpoints on social
and economic matters, the Church has
taken a decisive stand in favor of the liberal position. Details may be argued and
qualifications noted, but the total impact
of the encyclical is positive, liberal and
constructive.
One needs but list some of the major
positions of American conservatives, many
of them Catholic, and compare them with
Mater et Magistra to see the contrast. Of
course, the conservative viewpoint in the
United States is by no means uniform.
Russell Kirk might merely disagree with
much of the Pope's viewpoint, Senator
Goldwater should find it distasteful,
whereas Robert Welch should see in it an
almost complete negation and repudiation
of his social philosophy.
Catholics whose main social viewpoint
consists in sniping at the United Nations,
opposing foreign aid, trying to cripple labor
unions, fighting against welfare legislation,
and concentrating exclusively on internal
Communist subversion will find the pages
of this encyclical dry and bitter reading.
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Not only will they discover little support
for these views; they will rather note that
most times they are categorically rejected.
Even more decisive than detailed positions
is the spirit and tone of the document. It
is warm, humane, tolerant, hopeful, and
constructive. The Pope avoids condemnation and pessimism. He breathes warm
hope and encouragement.
A note of caution is sounded, however,
with reference to state power. While it is
obvious that the Holy Father finds much
good in the social legislation of recent
decades, it would not be accurate to state,
as did one headline, that the Pope endorses
the welfare state. This term is too inexact
to be the subject of papal approval or disapproval. But concrete elements often associated with the welfare state, such as
social insurance, health insurance, and subsidized housing are taken for granted as a
part of modern society. So likewise is the
work of many UN agencies, the mission of
technical assistance to developing nations,
and combined state and co-operative effort to rescue agriculture. The Pope writes
in terms of the highly complex society of
today. He refers to automation, nuclear
energy, monetary and fiscal controls of
the business cycle, the redistribution of
income through social security, inflation,
the effect of wage levels on employment,
and to many other contemporary world
problems.
Those who hold that the traditional concept of private property has lost some of
its meaning in American society are given
a respectful hearing. But the traditional
position, particularly as stated by Pope
Pius XI, is reaffirmed.
The pastoral concern of the Pontiff leads
him to state objectives demanded by justice, charity, and world peace. But he is
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very flexible in regard to means and techniques to be used to attain these ends. So
long as the rights of man and of the family
are safeguarded, the choice of methods is
a matter of political prudence. These general comments will be documented as specific issues are treated.
According to the analysis, the encyclical
does not offer any startling new comments
on labor unions. What may be significant
is the lack of criticism and the strong urging that labor be given more opportunity
to participate in profits, ownership, and
management of industry. The common
good demands that wage and other policies
provide employment "to the greatest number of workers." It warns that we must
"take care lest privileged classes arise, even
among workers." Yet, if national and international bodies make decisions that affect the welfare of individual plants and
companies, workers or their representatives should have some voice in the making
of such decisions.
While there are strong cultural, moral,
and spiritual reasons for encouraging farm
workers to remain on the farm, this aim
cannot be realized without necessary economic and social changes. The economic
changes include efforts to secure adequate
prices for farm products and income for
farmers. This can be done by government
or co-operative effort. "Today almost nobody hears, much less pays attention to,
isolated voices." Social changes involve
community efforts to make rural life more
desirable. Examples are better roads,
schools, health facilities.
Father Cronin concludes by stating:
So extensive is the scope of this Encyclical
that any commentary in article form is
bound to be highly selective. The remarks
offered here should stimulate readers to
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study deeply the original document. In this
connection, it is gratifying to learn that
America Press and Paulist Press are preparing better translations and are about to
publish them, with study aids, independently. There are inaccuracies and obscurities in the English text released in Rome.
The English speaking world deserves a
translation that does full justice to an historic encyclical, majestic in its scope and
pregnant with hope and encouragement to
the world.
The United States Supreme Court
Since Supreme Court decisions inevitably shape the structures of American
society, interest in the decisions and philosophy of the Court manifests the nation's
concern for its meaning and goals. For the
past four years the October issue of Social
Order has carried an article by John Dunsford which reviews the Court's activities of
the preceding court year. This year's article proves as informative and scholarly as
those of prior years.
According to the author, three diverse
prob!ems of religious pluralism were dealt
with during the term. A unanimous Court
struck down a Maryland constitutional provision requiring a declaration of belief in
the existence of God by public officials, in
the particular case a notary public.' The
Sunday closing or "blue" laws of three
states were upheld against a variety of
chal!enges, the center of the controversy
being the religious rights of Jews and other
Sabbatarians. 2 Attacks on a Connecticut
statute prohibiting the use of contraceptives and counsel as to their use by a doctor
1 Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
2 Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961); Gal-

lagher v. Crown Kosher Super Mkt., Inc., 366
U.S. 617 (1961); McGowan v. Maryland, 366
U.S. 420 (1961); Two Guys from HarrisonAllentown, Inc. v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582
(1961).

were avoided by a 5-4 court on the ground
that absence of enforcement made the
cases non-justiciable.a
All of these cases arose in the matrix of
federalism, since each of the plaintiffs relied on the protection of the fourteenth
amendment to the Constitution against legislation enacted by different states. The
Sunday closing and notary public controversies appealed to the first amendment
(made applicable in effect through the
fourteenth) which commands that the state
"shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof. . . ." The Connecticut
contraceptive statute, on the other hand,
was argued as a deprivation of life and
liberty without due process of law. That
the Court could find such massive evidence
of non-enforcement as to dismiss the case
is a rather crushing verification of the hollowness of such laws. The issue, however,
will undoubtedly return sooner or later in
a justiciable form.
In the area of criminal law, an unusually
large number of important cases were decided during the term. The most radical
departure from existing law was the 6-3
decision in Mapp v. Ohio4 where the Court
extended the ban on the use of illegally
seized evidence in criminal cases, the rule
in federal courts since 1914, to state courts
as well. This was the final step in a process
of reformulating the original principle on
which the exclusionary rule was based.
Long-awaited decisions on the constitutionality of the registration requirements of
the Internal Security Act, revealed a
closely-divided Court. For ten years the
Subversive Activities Control Board has
been seeking to compel registration of the
8 Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
4 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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Communist party with the Attorney General. Deficiencies in the administrative proceedings, including the use of perjured
evidence given by several witnesses, had
postponed the Court's confrontation of the
basic constitutional issues. The Act is a
comprehensive regulatory scheme demanding extensive filing of information by communist-action or communist-front organizations, including the names of officers and
members. Such groups and individuals are
then subject to certain disabilities: among
other things, they must identify themselves
in publications and radio or television
broadcasts; income tax exemptions and
contribution deductions are lost; employment in defense facilities and labor organizations is forbidden; applications for
passports are unlawful. The Communist
party sought to litigate the constitutionality
of each of these consequences, but from a
voluminous record and multiple claims,
the Court, in an opinion by Justice Frankfurter, decided only that there was no legal
infirmity in the registration requirement as
such. Litigation of the other problems was
dismissed as premature, "addressed to future and hypothetical controversies. ' '5
In discussing the equal protection clause,
Professor Dunsford explains that in its
steady infusion of the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment with
a realistic standard of racial equality, the
Court has experienced difficulty in some
cases; the problem arises in enunciating
principles which by their breadth do not
threaten other interests of the society. Since
the Constitution only inhibits state action,
the distinction is usually made that racially
discriminatory action of a private character, in the absence of appropriate legis5Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1 (1961).
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lation, is not legally prohibited. Public
school segregation and discriminatory seating on municipally-operated transportation
are relatively easy cases, for there the state
control is indisputable. The trouble begins
when the discriminatory relationship involves private parties who are in various
ways linked with state organs.
Since the twentieth century state has enlarged its domain of activity and multiplied
its lines of cooperation with private enterprise, a growing number of social institutions function hand-in-glove with state
power. What constitutes "state action" for
purposes of control by the Constitution
then becomes exceedingly complex. An example of the reach of the constitutional
claim may be found in the sit-ins. Participants could contend that the use of police
and laws forbidding trespass on private
property buttresses the discrimination
practices of merchants in a way that represents "state action." Nor is the dilemma
restricted to racial questions. Labor unions
partially derive their exclusive bargaining
status for employees in a given unit from
the compulsion of law; thus, it is arguable
that they are subject to all the particulars
of equal protection and due process. Again,
the governmental support of private educational institutions might have similar
legal consequences. This term the Court
revisited this general problem in several
race cases as well as in situations where
dues from labor members, and lawyers in
an integrated bar association, were being
used for political purposes opposed by the
complaining individuals.
Professor Dunsford concludes, in part,
by pointing out that on the matter of applying proper standards to outlaw the obscene, the Court again manifested its deep
concern that overzealous or loose judgment
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of a censor may inhibit publications which
are within the protections of the first
amendment. In Marcus v. Search Warrants6 it unanimously struck down a Missouri procedure by which police officers
had obtained warrants to seize magazines
merely on the opinion of the police that
they were obscene. Moreover, the warrant
gave broad discretion to examine all the
publications of the particular distributor
and make ad hoc determinations of their
legality. While the material thus seized was
tied up by judicial testing of the matter,
the Court pointed out, the legal as well as
the illegal material would be withheld. In
the particular case, 180 publications which
were seized were found not obscene.
The Eichmann Trial
Readers of The Catholic Lawyer may
recall that mention was made in the last
issue of an article dealing with the moral
aspects of the Eichmann trial. 7 The legal
aspects are also being reviewed in various
articles now that the trial has concluded.
One of the best of the series dealing with
the legality of the trial and collateral issues
is by Professor Hans Baade and appears in
the Summer 1961 issue of the Duke Law
Journal under the title, "The Eichmann
Trial: Some Legal Aspects." The article
deals with the subject both under Israeli
law and under international law.
In discussing Israeli law on the issue of
whether criminal jurisdiction can be obtained through the forcible abduction of
the accused from a foreign jurisdiction,
the author comes to the interesting conclusion that English courts "have no power to
go into the question, once a prisoner is in
lawful custody in this country, of the cir6 367 U.S. 717 (1961).
77 CATHOLIC LAWYER 150 (1961).

cumstances in which he may have been
brought here." The same principle of male
captus, bene detentus, has, incidentally,
also been recognized by well over twenty
states of the United States and by the
United States Supreme Court in a long
line of cases.
It should be added, however, that Professor Austin W. Scott, Jr. has ably argued
that the principle of discouraging police
illegality that precludes the receivability ot
evidence obtained in violation of rights
protected against state action by the fourteenth amendment should be extended to
cases of kidnapping of fugitives from justice across state lines. But the persuasiveness of this argument is limited to the
United States constitutional system, and at
least until there is a widespread reversal
of the impressive line of cases holding that
force or fraud in capture do not vitiate
criminal jurisdiction, the courts of Israel
will be on safe ground in following the
principle male captus, bene detentus. Judging from the newspaper reports, the District Court of Jerusalem would appear to
have so decided on a preliminary objection
to its jurisdiction, and while this ruling
might be challenged on appeal, it seems to
be amply supported by precedent.
The article points out that since Argentina renounced any claim for the return of
Eichmann by settling for a public apology,
the trial is not in violation of international
f
law.
On the issue of whether Israel can try
Eichmann for acts committed before 1945
under a statute enacted in 1950, the maxim,
nulla poena sine lege, is not a rule of general international law. While most states including the Soviet Union since 1958 have adopted the principle that acts or
omissions can be punished only if already
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punishable at the time of their commission,
there are still substantial exceptions from
this principle. For one thing, some states,
such as Denmark, specifically authorize the
analogous application of penal statutes to
situations not expressly dealt with therein.
Secondly, where criminal law is customary,
i.e., judge-made, it necessarily is retroactive whenever a new crime is created by
judicial decision, unless the decision is
made prospective only. Thirdly, even in
states with an entirely codified criminal
law, judicial decisions on previously doubtful questions, or reversals of previous precedents are retroactive. Finally, a number
of states have enacted expressly retroactive
criminal statutes to deal with collaborators
after World War II.
Nevertheless, several international conventions and declarations, such as the 1949
Red Cross conventions, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Draft Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, and
the European Convention on Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, in
principle proscribe retroactive criminal
statutes. While these conventions and declarations do not afford a sufficient basis
for the assertion that international law prohibits retroactive penal laws, they neverthe'ess lend support to the theory that
states are not permitted to subject aliens to
criminal prosecution on the basis of criminal statutes making punishable that which
could not reasonably have been expected
to be illegal at the time of its commission.
It would seem that little argument is
needed to show that such a rule- if it
exists - is not violated by the prosecution
of Eichmann under the 1950 Law. The
District Court of Tel Aviv has described
this law as "retroactive."
Professor Baade also considers the ques-
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tion of whether international law permits
a state to punish an alien for an offense
committed abroad which is punishable both
under the law of the place of commission
and under the law of the place of prosecution, provided the punishment imposed
does not exceed the penalty incurred in
the place of commission. He holds that the
answer can only be in the affirmative. All
states are interested in bringing alleged
criminals to justice; no state is interested
in harboring fugitives from justice. On the
other hand, no state is obliged, in the absence of treaty, to extradite persons who
are alleged to have committed offenses
abroad; the machinery of extradition is
rather cumbersome, to say the least; even
where states are willing, in the absence of
treaty, to effect extradition, formal obstacles such as the lack of diplomatic relations may well prevent or delay the
delivery of the person accused. While extradition remains cumbersome and of limited applicability, the answer to the
dilemma, at least as between states which
have little or no formal preadmission procedures for aliens, is criminal law enforcement by proxy.
Professor Baade sums up with the following observation:
Even if the Federal Republic of Germany
wanted to - or by Eicbmann's action in an
administrative tribunal, were compelled to
- object to Israel's exercise of penal jurisdiction over Adolf Eichmann, this objection
would fail to affect the legality of the Eichmann trial under international law. For the
Federal Republic of Germany is all but
absolutely precluded from raising objections
to any exercise of criminal jurisdiction by
proxy. Section four of the German Penal
Code expressly provides that German penal
law is applicable to offenses committed by
an alien abroad, if these offenses are punishable under the law of the place where

IN OTHER PUBLICATIONS

they were committed, and if, although extradition is in principle permissible for that
particular type of offenses, there is, in fact,
no extradition. If Germany claims jurisdiction to try an Israeli Eichmann for offenses
committed in Israel, Germany cannot fairly
object to Israel's claim to jurisdiction to try
a German Eichmann for offenses committed
in Germany.
Positivism
Perhaps the most fundamental problem
of jurisprudence is embodied in the ageold argument about the nature of law,
whether ius quia iustum or ius quia iussum,
whether law is essentially constituted by
being just or by being commanded, whether
it is essentially of reason or essentially of
will. The mediaeval tradition in English
jurisprudence, which was based upon the
Christian view of man as a rational being
subject to eternal, natural, divine, and
human law and upon the Christian view
of human law as the complement and supplement of natural law, firmly adhered to
a reason-theory of law.
The modem tradition is essentially committed to a will-theory of law. In the words
of Thomas Hobbes, the father of legal
positivism, law "is not Counsell, but Command," and "Command is, where a man
saith, Doe this, or Doe not this, without
expecting other reason than the Will of
him that sayes it." The essence of legal
positivism is thus the belief that whatever
the legislator posits as law, no more and
no less, is law; one cannot go behind the
command of the legislator to question its
reasonableness, for the legislator's expressed will is, of itself, law.
An excellent and searching scrutiny of
legal positivism may be found in the current issue of the University of Toronto
Law Journal. Professor Mark MacGuigan

in an article entitled "Law, Morals, and
Posivitism," after tracing the history and
growth of legal positivism argues that the
dependence of the legal on the moral order
was brought out a half-century ago by Sir
John Salmond. He defined law as "the
rules recognized and acted on by courts ofjustice" and stressed that what a litigant
obtains in a court of justice "is essentially
and primarily justice and not law." Salmond had a clear conception of the nature
of the "ought" implied by justice, for he
writes: "the statement that a man ought
to do a certain act presupposes some
appointed end, and indicates that the act
in question is the proper means to that
end." St. Thomas Aquinas himself could
not state the nature of obligation better:
law is a necessary means to a necessary
end, and obligation arises from this relationship of means to end. This is the nature
of all obligation, legal or moral. Moral
obligation involves the perception by reason of this means-end relationship. Legal
obligation adds to this the positive act of
legislation on the part of the lawgiver, but
since it includes reason's perception of the
necessity of an act in relation to a necessary end, it is essentially founded on moral
obligation, which is just another name for
this perception of reason. The subjective
motives of the citizens in their obedience
do not matter; what matters is the objective worthiness of the legal rule to obligate,
that is, its objective and necessary relationship to a necessary end. In the words of
d'Entr~ves, "law may or may not be obeyed
for the sake of its obligatoriness. But there
is only one ground for the obligation of
the law, and this is a moral ground." Moral
obligation is the very soul of legal obligation, and without it legal obligation is
devitalized and lifeless, a mere corpse.
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In refuting positivism, Professor MacGuigan has this to say:
Of course, reason plays some part in positivistic jurisprudence, as it must in all things
human, but its role is as a rationalizing
rather than as a rational force. Reason is
employed to rationalize and systematize the
primary datum, law as willed. A will-theory
of law cannot get along without using reason
to this extent, but it is a strictly subsidiary
role for reason. It is never allowed to get to
the root of the matter, never allowed to
consider the reasonableness of the rule itself, for the rule has no reasonableness per
se - any reasonableness it has is purely accidental. I believe it is this rationalizing role
of reason which Professor Fuller has in
mind when he writes that "law, considered
merely as order, contains . . . its own im-

plicit morality" and that "this morality of
order must be respected if we are to create
anything that can be called law, even bad
law." In a will-theory reason can be nothing
more than a veneer applied to something
already fully constructed by the will of the
lawgiver. But this is not enough, for, as
Fuller puts it, "law, as something deserving
loyalty, must represent a human achievement; it cannot be a simple fiat of power
...

."

The thoroughgoing adherence of posi-

tivism to a will-theory of law involves a
denial of the moral content of law and
a consequent inability to explain legal
obligation.
The author notes in conclusion that it
is easy to understand why the legal positivists exclude reason, morals, and obligation from their conception of law, for these
elements are the complex aspects of legal
reality, and the fundamental desire of the
positivists is to simplify reality into a form
that can be absorbed by positivism. In
their desire to keep law clear, distinct, and
simple they eliminate from its essence
everything but will. The legal world of
Austin is thus a vacuum world, "pure" but
artificial. Unfortunately for Austin, man
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cannot escape the real world, crude and
unsystematized as it may be.
There is something sub-human about a
positivistic jurisprudence, which conceives
of law as sheer wilfulness and sees man as
responding to the crack of the sovereign's
whip. Any will-theory necessarily and inevitably conceives of man as at best a
child, at worst an animal, for it holds that
he need be told only what to do. But this
is not enough for man, who has been endowed with reason and whose reason demands an answering echo from law. Man
must therefore know not only what is the
right thing to do but also why it is the
right thing. No will-theory of law can ever
explain law and thus give satisfaction to
the human mind, because by its very nature it eschews any attempt to explain. But
in the long run man must be led, not
driven, and so, in the long run, he will
reject legal positivism, because its emphasis on arbitrary will and the consequent
separation of law and morals have rendered
it incapable of explaining legal obligation.
Life, Death, Law
Few books dealing with law and morality in recent years have attracted more
widespread comment and attention than
Life, Death, and the Law by Norman St.
John-Stevas. Because of this interest,
Father L. C. McHugh, S.J., Associate Editor of America magazine has been invited
to review the book for the next issue of
The Catholic Lawyer.
In a recent review of the book which
appears in the August 1961 issue of the
Notre Dame Lawyer, Dean Charles Sheedy
of the University of Notre Dame explains
that the chapters of Mr. St. John-Stevas'
book attempt to establish and apply principles and guidelines to aid the law in the
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touchy matter of legislating morality. The
law should bear in mind its outer-directedness towards public order and external
peace. Thus prohibition of private homosexual activity between consenting adult
males, for instance, should go out of the
criminal law. Again, public law in moral
matters requires a "moral consensus," in
the absence of which groups should refrain
from pushing for laws as part of a power
struggle in which the moral issue itself
tends to get lost. The Catholic side of the
contraception issue no longer enjoys a
moral consensus, and the Catholic body
in, for example, Massachusetts and Connecticut has no right to enforce its view
through public law. However, though moral
consensus may be lacking in a portion of
an issue, it may be present or at least
possibly present in another portion. Thus
Catholics, abandoning the struggle for
legal prohibition of contraception, may still
rightly press for legislation against advertising, sale to unmarried minors, sale from
slot machines, and provisions for contraception in foreign aid programs. Whether
a. moral consensus exists as to a given
issue should be determined by peaceful
democratic processes. No group should attempt to use naked power, but rational
persuasion only. Mr. St. John-Stevas suggests that the Catholic legislators of Connecticut might, for a change, turn their
attention towards the state's compulsory
sterilization law, just as much against Catholic morals as contraception, and discover
if they might find a moral consensus for
the repeal of that law.
Dean Sheedy observes further that no
side is favored in Mr. St. John-Stevas'
book. Catholic intransigence has placed the
Catholic Church in the unwelcome, unrewarding, and ultimately impractical role of

watchdog of everybody's conscience. But
Protestant and liberal Protestant relativism,
personalism, opportunism, changing with
the times, joining up with anybody, place
Protestants under a strong necessity of
coming to some decision as to where, morally, they stand. Short of bloody murder,
there seems now to be almost no manifestation of human behavior that does not
find some ministers and others willing not
only to condone and permit, but enthusiastically to support and sign petitions for.
Besides the Catholic and Protestant, other
positions, secularist-liberal and utilitarian,
receive review and criticism in this book.
He concludes:
Life, Death, and the Law is a truly didactic
book, in the best sense of that word. It
teaches, and the reader learns from it. It
is full of good law, good moral theology,
and good sociology and criticism. It is clear,
cogent, and persuasive throughout its development, arguments, and recommendations.

Charitable Contributions
A subject of much concern and discussion today is the financing of higher education in the United States. Since the need
for additional financing is ever increasing,
resort must be made to all available sources
of revenue. One source upon which private
educational institutions always have relied
and to which state supported institutions
now must look is charitable contributions
from private donors. An article entitled
"Taxes and Charitable Giving to the University," by Professor William Bowe, in the
April 1961 issue of the Rocky Mountain
Law Review, contains information on the
federal and state tax consequences of charitable contributions to educational institutions. It was prepared primarily for the
use of lawyers whose clients may wish to
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make inter vivos gifts or testamentary bequests to colleges or universities.
Professor Bowe points out several very
interesting tax advantages to this type of
contribution resulting from the fact that
federal and state government bear a substantial portion of the cost of most gifts to
private schools. Thus, if a donor is in a
50 per cent federal income tax bracket and
a 10 per cent state bracket, the net cost of
a gift of $5,000 by him to a school may be
only $2,000. Indeed, if he makes the gift
in appreciated property the net cost may
be considerably less. The exact cost in any
particular case may be determined, based
upon the donor's estimated adjusted gross
(federal) and net (state) income, by reference to federal and state income tax tables.
Where stocks, bonds, real estate, or
other property are given, it may be advisable to select assets that have a low income
tax cost basis since the transfer to the
school will escape the capital gains tax.
Thus if stock costing $10, now worth $50,
is given to the school, a deduction of $50
is allowed and the potential capital gains
tax on the $40 profit is avoided. In most
cases it will be found preferable to give
appreciated property rather than cash.
Conversely, assets that have a current value
of less than their tax basis should be sold
and the proceeds given to the school. Such
a sale entitles the donor to a tax loss which
would not be available to him if he had
given the property itself to the school.
A donor may wish to give only his
profit in appreciated property to the school.
Here it is possible in some cases to sell,
for example, the stock that cost him $10,
.and is now worth $40, to the school for
$10. This will result in a recovery of his
original investment and entitle him to a
$40 charitable deduction. No capital gain
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will be recognized where the sale price is
limited to the donor's cost basis. The authority for this conclusion is the leading
case of Reginald Fincke,8 which held no
gain was realized by a donor on the sale
of shares at cost to family trusts even
though the current market value of the
shares was very substantially in excess of
the sale price.
Capital Punishment
The pros and cons of capital punishment
continue to be debated in the law journals
throughout the country. The latest offering
appearing in the May 1961 issue of the
Cleveland-Marshall Law Review, is entitled "Should Ohio Abolish Capital Punishment?" by Richard Goetz.
Ohio is one of twenty-two states which
presently employ electrocution as the
method of execution. Twelve states use
lethal gas, while seven states employ hanging. Mississippi and New Mexico recently
changed their method of execution from
electrocution to lethal gas, while Oklahoma
is still using electrocution until a gas chamber is provided. Apparently these states
feel that lethal gas is a more merciful
method of execution. In Utah, a condemned man has a choice of being hanged
or shot.
Of the remaining states, six have abolished capital punishment entirely, while
three, though counted as abolition states,
still retain it for a few rare offenses, namely
treason and murder in prison by a convicted murderer. Nine states, after having
abolished capital punishment, reinstated
it; usually after a spectacularly heinous
crime. Maine, it is interesting to note, abolished the death penalty in 1876, restored it
8 39 B.T.A. 510 (1939).
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in 1883, and abolished it again in 1887.
Michigan was the first state to abolish the
death penalty. In 1958, Delaware became
the first state in forty-three years to abolish capital punishment. The nation's two
newest states, Alaska and Hawaii, came
into the union without the death penalty.
Mr. Goetz, in analysing the proponents
viewpoint of capital punishment, states
that the arguments for retention of the
death penalty center around two main
points: (1) It deters crime. (2) The criminal must pay society for his offense.
Probably the chief forces against elemination of the death penalty in Ohio, as in
other states, are police officers and law
enforcement agents. Their main contention
is that the life of a policeman will become
more hazardous if the criminal knows that
he can kill and not face a death sentence.
Police authorities state that the threat of
death exerts important influence in many
situations prior to the final moment when
a crime is committed. This threat, it is
said, is what leads robbers, for example, to
use unloaded guns, and persuades burglars
to go unarmed.
In discussing the opposing viewpoint the
author states that opponents of the death
penalty cite various reasons to show why
its use should be abolished. Probably the
most comprehensive study in recent years
was compiled in a report submitted to the
Delaware legislature when it was conducting hearings on a proposed resolution to
abandon the death penalty. The basic arguments presented in this report were:.
(1) The evidence clearly shows that execution does not act as a deterrent
to capital crimes.
(2) The serious offenses are committed, except in rare instances, by

those suffering from mental disturbances; are impulsive in nature,
and are not acts of the "criminal"
class.
(3) When the death sentence is removed as a possible punishment,
more convictions are possib'e with
fewer delays.
(4) Unequal application of the law
takes place because those executed
are the poor, the ignorant, and the
unfortunate without resources.
Convictions of the innocent do occur and death makes a miscarriage
of justice irrevocable. Human judgment can not be infallible.
(6) The state sets a bad example when
it takes a life. Imitative crimes and
murder are stimulated by executions.
(7) Legally taking a life is useless and
demoralizing to the general public.

(5)

(8)

(9)

A trial where a life may be at stake
is highly sensationalized, adversely
affects the administration of justice,
and is bad for the community.
Society is amply protected by a
sentence of life imprisonment.

Natural Law
One of the more meaningful articles in
current periodicals which deal with philosophy is the one entitled "St. Thomas
and Legal Obligation," by Mark MacGuigan, in the July 1961 issue of The New
Scholasticism. (As noted earlier, Professor
MacGuigan also appears currently in the
University of Toronto Law Journal.)
Legal obligation, so says Dr. MacGuigan, depends upon both intrinsic and extrinsic causes, but in different ways. The
intrinsic cause, the natural law, is the pri-
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mary and general cause of legal obligation,
whereas the extrinsic cause, legislative authority, is the particular cause which determines the general cause to a specific
effect. There is no conflict between the
two causes because each is restricted in its
efficacy to the area in which it coalesces
with the other: natural law does not give
rise to legal obligation unless the ruler of
the community has made a particular determination, and the ruler cannot oblige
his subjects in conscience unless his determination is in accordance with natural law.
Not only is there no conflict between the
causes but indeed their cooperation gives
rise to mutual fulfillment. The natural law,
incomplete in itself as a guide for human
conduct, demands fulfillment by positive
law. Conversely, the work of the legislator
is made possible by the natural law, because the very existence of an authoritative,
external power is prescribed by the natural
law precept of sociability, and because his
commands, as rational and not as volitional, strike a responsive chord in the
subject. The ruler, then, merely causes the
subject to realize the good which he would
have chosen for himself had he recognized
its desirability. Hence an intrinsic cause,
the inherent rationality of human law because of its conformity with the law of the
subjects' nature, is the primary reason for
the ruler's power to oblige his subjects,
and indeed the very submission of the subjects to the ruler's authority is conditional
upon the submission of the ruler himself
to the natural legal order.
The obligation of human law thus comes
primarily from natural law, but not as
from something extrinsic to it. For St.
Thomas, human law is derived from natural law and is law only in so far as it is in
accord with the principles of natural law.
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On the one hand, this means that an edict
clearly at variance with natural law precepts is not law and is not binding in conscience, unless perhaps accidentally for
extrinsic reasons, viz., the avoidance of
scandal or the maintenance of civil peace.
On the other hand, it also means that every
valid human law is binding in conscience,
and that it is thus obligatory primarily because of the natural law which exists within
it. The natural law is not something entirely apart from human law, to be left
behind as a mere starting point once the
realm of human law is entered. On the
contrary it is present in every valid law as
part of it, for it is the very root both of
human law in general and of every individual human law.
In one sense, then, it is right to say that
St. Thomas finds the primary source of the
obligation of human law not within that
law itself but within the natural law. But
in another sense it is more right to say that,
though St. Thomas posits the natural law
as the primary source of legal obligation,
he still finds that source within human law,
for the natural law itself exists within the
very substance of human law as its root.
The primary obligation of human law is
reduced by St. Thomas to that of the natural law, its rule and measure, by an intrinsic reduction. Law is not an arbitrary
imposition upon man from the outside, but
rather exists within himself originally and
outside himself only subsequently and in
accordance with the exigencies of his nature. Thus not only is the obligation of
natural law intrinsic, but even that of human law is more principally intrinsic than
extrinsic. Human law is the complement
and completion of natural law, and legal
obligation, in turn, is the consequence and
fulfillment of the obligation of natural law.
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Aid to Education
Writing in the October 1961 issue of
The Catholic Educator, Father John Evans
joins the group of those educators who
take issue with the current governmental
policy of denying federal aid to non-public
schools. His article, entitled "Fossils and
Federal Aid," points up the fact that ten
years ago, in dealing with the basic rights
of parents, Article Two of the Council of
Europe's Convention of Human Rights declared that:
[N]o person shall be denied the right to
education. In the exercise of any function
which it assumes in relation to education
and to teaching, the State shall respect the
rights of paren*ts to ensure such education
and teaching as is conformable to their religious and philosophical convictions.
In 1955, the prominent Union International Pour La Libert6 D'enseignment, directing attention on the child, unanimously
resolved: "Distributive justice demands
that all schools have part -of the public
funds so as to reduce the excessive difference noticeable in the conditions of children in the public schools and those in the
free schools." Representatives from ten democracies agreed that western nations impale themselves on the horns of a normal
dilemma whenever they "affirm the formal
and juridical democratic right of liberty of
education but effectively deny that right by
refusing the material conditions for its
exercise."
The United Nations has given formulation to ideals in this matter. In 1959 its
Declaration of the Rights of the Child
stated in Principle Two: "The child shall
enjoy special protection, and shall be given
opportunities and facilities by law and by
other means, to enable him to develop
physically, mentally, morally, spiritually,

and socially in a healthy and normal manner and in conditions of freedom and dignity." On this point, the General Assembly
adopted the interpretation of the drafting
committee that "in the enactment of laws
for this purpose, the best interest of the
child shall be the paramount consideration." In Principle Seven, the Declaration
indicates that while the best interest of the
child shall be the guiding principles of
those responsible for his education and
guidance, "that responsibility lies in the
first place with his parents."
In reviewing these resolutions and principles, it is embarrassing to reflect that
they find reality in the United States, primarily because of the glowing convictions
and sacrifices of a minority of our fellow
citizens. Furthermore, we should be appalled because, unlike these other free naStions, there is not a single state or federal
constitutional provision in the legal corpus
of the United States which directly guarantees the rights of non-public schools to
exist, or parents to build and support them,
or of children to attend them.
Father Evans comments on these facts
as follows:
It is time for us to accept the fact that in
the question of public aid to non-public
schools performing a public service, our
state educational systems, both- in theory
and in practice, are following an outmoded
pattern. It is time for us to act in the direction of change. It is difficult to see how we
as a free nation, already jarred somewhat
off balance for our tardy action to relieve
the illogical and cruel plight of Indians, Negroes, and Mexicans, already somewhat
projected before the world as a calcified
democracy, can assume a dynamic posture
which will effectively ward off further
thrusts should those who attempt to marshall world opinion choose to aim at our
restrictive educational policies.

